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The Arctic Council at Twenty: 
How to Remain Effective in a Rapidly 
Changing Environment 
Oran R. Young* 
The Arctic today differs profoundly from the Arctic twenty years ago 
at the time of the transition from the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy to the Arctic Council. In another twenty years, conditions prevailing 
in the region are certain to have changed again in significant ways. The 
major changes occurring over the past twenty years are biophysical (e.g., the 
recession and thinning of sea ice), economic (e.g., the increased accessibility 
of Arctic energy resources), and political (e.g., Russia’s renewed aspirations 
to great power status) in nature. A common feature of these changes is that 
they are strengthening the links between what happens in the Arctic, treated 
as a distinct region, and what happens in the overarching global system. 
How are these changes affecting the role of the Arctic Council, and how can 
the Council’s members position this body to maximize its effectiveness under 
changed and changing circumstances? This Article seeks to answer these 
questions. In the process, it touches on a range of topics, including the legal 
and political status of the Council, the scope of the Council’s mandate, links 
between the Council and other intergovernmental bodies, and the 
administrative and material resources needed to enhance the effectiveness of 
the Council. The concluding section identifies a range of changes that may 
unfold in the coming years and asks what impacts they are likely to have on 
the operation of the Arctic Council. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Arctic Council, launched in 1996 under the terms of the Ottawa 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,1 has proven more effective 
than most of us who were present at its creation anticipated.2 The key to the success 
of the Council lies in the role it has played in identifying emerging issues, framing 
them for consideration on the part of policymakers, and promoting these issues as 
matters of priority on a variety of policy agendas rather than focusing on its ability 
to make formal decisions, much less to play a prominent role in implementing such 
decisions or moving them from paper to practice. To take a few prominent 
examples, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report focused 
attention on contaminants like persistent organic pollutants and highlighted the 
need to control transboundary flows of these contaminants; the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment empirically documented the tangible effects of climate change in the high 
latitudes and strengthened the foundations of the global climate negotiations; and 
the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment provided context for ongoing efforts to devise 
a mandatory Polar Code for commercial ships operating in Arctic waters under the 
auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).3 
This “generative” role does not depend on the authority of a body like the 
Arctic Council to make formal decisions, much less on the capacity to oversee the 
implementation of policies once they are in place.4 Generative activities are modest 
in some respects. They focus, for the most part, on the early stages of the overall 
policy cycle rather than on the stages of decision making and implementation. But 
it is important not to underestimate the significance of this role. As all students of 
public policy know, the ability to frame the issues and shape the agenda can have 
profound consequences for the course of public policy.5 While some participants 
 
1. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387 
[hereinafter Ottawa Declaration]. 
2. For an extensive and well-informed account of the founding of the Arctic Council, see JOHN 
ENGLISH, ICE AND WATER: POLITICS, PEOPLES, AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (Margaret MacMillan & 
Robert Bothwell eds., 2013). 
3. See Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, (L. Brigham & B. 
Ellis eds., 2009), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd
_print. pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y9Y-Y9S7]; A. Nilsson, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of 
the Arctic Environment Report, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (1997), 
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-pollution-issues-a-state-of-the-arctic-environment
-report/67; Susan Joy Hassol, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 
Impacts of a Warming Arctic, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Carolyn Symon ed., 2004),  
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786. 
4. For a general account of the differences between generative, regulatory, and procedural roles, 
see ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1999). 
5. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 205–19 (1984). 
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have sought to promote the idea that the Arctic Council can and should assume a 
more prominent role in the making of policy choices, a central premise of my 
analysis is that the primary role of this body will continue to center on issue framing 
and agenda formation during the coming years. 
At the same time, the broader setting in which the Arctic Council operates has 
experienced far-reaching changes over the last twenty years. For purposes of 
analysis, it is helpful to focus on specific changes and to think of them in terms of 
biophysical, economic, and geopolitical forces. But these forces are interdependent 
and highly interactive. The impacts of climate change, for instance, have played a 
critical role in increasing the accessibility of the Arctic’s energy and mineral 
resources. Geopolitical changes may give rise to a securitization narrative that raises 
questions about the attractiveness of these resources. Taken together, therefore, the 
impact of these changes on conditions prevailing in the Arctic is greater than the 
sum of its parts. The consequences are certain to be felt going forward into the 
future. 
How will these changes affect the activities of the Arctic Council, and what 
can and should be done to maintain the effectiveness of the Council as these 
overarching conditions change? The first substantive section of this Article 
provides a brief account of the drivers of change in the Arctic that are likely to have 
significant implications for the pursuit of international cooperation in the region 
and for the role of the Arctic Council in particular. A critical observation, in this 
regard, is that one of the key consequences of these forces of change is a tightening 
of the links between the Arctic as a distinct region and the global biophysical and 
socioeconomic setting in which the region is situated. In the next section, I turn to 
an analysis of the implications of the emergence of what many observers refer to as 
the “new” Arctic for the operation of the Arctic Council.6 In the process, I address 
several questions that have generated considerable interest among practitioners and 
analysts alike: Would it be beneficial to formalize the status of the Council, making 
it into a “normal” intergovernmental organization? Is there a case for broadening 
the remit of the Council beyond the emphasis on environmental protection and 
sustainable development specified in the Ottawa Declaration? What is the proper 
relationship between the Council and other intergovernmental bodies, such as the 
IMO, the OSPAR Commission, or the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission? 
Are there ways to strengthen the administrative and financial capacity of the Council 
that are both politically feasible and likely to enhance the effectiveness of the 
Council significantly? The final section of the Article looks toward the future and 
reflects both on changes in the Arctic going forward and on ways to maintain (or 
even enhance) the effectiveness of the Arctic Council in light of changes to come. 
 
6. For a discussion of the “new” Arctic, see ALUN ANDERSON, AFTER THE ICE: LIFE, DEATH, 
AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE NEW ARCTIC (2009). 
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I. THE FORCES OF CHANGE 
The Arctic is experiencing transformative biophysical changes, driven for the 
most part by forces operating beyond the confines of the region. The impacts of 
persistent organic pollutants (POPs) produced outside the Arctic but transported 
to the region via waterborne and airborne vectors, where they bioaccumulate in a 
manner that has detrimental consequences for human health, is now well-known, 
partly as a result of the work of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 
operating initially under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy and subsequently under the auspices of the Arctic Council.7 The 
dissemination of up-to-date and reliable information on the impact of POPs on 
Arctic ecological and human systems is understood to have played a role of some 
significance in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the 2001 Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.8 
Without doubt, however, the most important biophysical driver of 
transformation in the Arctic is climate change. It is now well documented and widely 
acknowledged that the impacts of climate change are unfolding more rapidly in the 
Arctic than in any other part of the world. The iconic manifestation of this 
phenomenon is the dramatic recession and thinning of sea ice in the Arctic Basin, 
which has proceeded at a rate that exceeds the most extreme projections of bodies 
like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).9 This impact of 
climate change has become a focus of intense interest in the private sector as well 
as the public sector because it is the recession of sea ice that is making the Arctic 
more accessible to those interested in extracting the region’s natural resources, and 
to those interested in the region’s potential for commercial shipping. But the decline 
of sea ice is by no means the only significant consequence of climate change in the 
Arctic. Other important impacts include increases in coastal erosion resulting from 
storm surges, the melting of permafrost, and, above all, ocean acidification, which 
is particularly severe in the high latitudes due to the fact that carbon dioxide 
dissolves more rapidly in cold water than in warm water. Positive feedback 
processes intensify these effects. For instance, open water absorbs more solar 
radiation than sea ice, a mechanism that increases the rate at which remaining sea 
ice melts. Beyond these effects lies the impact of climate change on the Greenland 
ice sheet. This ice sheet is now experiencing seasonal melting on an unprecedented 
scale.10 Whether and when this process will lead to the disintegration of the 
 
7. DAVID P. STONE, THE CHANGING ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: THE ARCTIC MESSENGER 
106–80 (2015). 
8. See David L. Downie, Global POPs Policy: The 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, in NORTHERN LIGHTS AGAINST POPS: COMBATTING TOXIC THREATS IN THE ARCTIC 
136–637 (David L. Downie & Terry Fenge eds., 2003). 
9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ARCTIC MATTERS: THE GLOBAL 
CONNECTION TO CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC (2015), http://nas-sites.org/arctic/files/2015/06/
Arctic_Matters-booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC9U-MVEG]. 
10. Id.; WORKING GROUP 1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
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Greenland ice sheet is a focus of intense interest in the scientific community. But it 
is worth noting in this regard both that seasonal melt water on the surface of the ice 
sheet triggers a positive feedback process by absorbing more solar radiation than 
ice and that the volume of ice locked in the Greenland ice sheet is sufficient to raise 
sea levels on a global basis by an estimated six to seven meters. 
The collapse of sea ice in the Arctic in 2007 triggered an extraordinary wave 
of speculation about a scramble for the Arctic’s natural resources, the dramatic 
growth of commercial shipping in the Arctic, and the emergence of tensions and 
even armed clashes associated with potential “resource wars.”11 It is easy enough to 
grasp the appeal of the Arctic in an era of economic globalization. The U.S. 
Geological Survey issued a widely read report in 2008 forecasting that the Arctic 
contains some eleven percent of the world’s recoverable reserves of oil and thirty 
percent of the recoverable reserves of natural gas.12 Numerous reports based on 
simple geographical calculations presented projections regarding the attractions of 
Arctic shipping routes when compared with alternatives like the Suez Canal Route. 
The apparent political stability of the Arctic enhanced the appeal of Arctic shipping 
routes in contrast to alternative routes afflicted by political instabilities, like those in 
the Middle East, and by the growing problem of piracy. In the first flush of 
enthusiasm, many casual observers concluded that the Arctic was emerging as a 
critical region with regard to the future trajectory of economic globalization. 
Today, less than a decade later, this picture seems far more complex and 
generally less appealing in economic terms. Arctic energy resources and nonfuel 
minerals are plentiful, but they are expensive both to extract and to transport to 
markets. Energy economists, for example, argue that world market prices below 
$80–90 a barrel will make Arctic oil uneconomical, an observation of great 
importance given recent trends in the world oil market.13 Commercial navigation in 
the Arctic is fraught with problems, including the continuing dangers of sea ice, the 
shallow water in key channels, the lack of adequate hydrographic charts, the absence 
of suitable infrastructure, and the difficulty of adhering to fixed schedules under 
Arctic conditions.14 Current thinking is that container ships will not find transit 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20141126061207/https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/ 
wg1/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf]. 
11. See ROGER HOWARD, THE ARCTIC GOLD RUSH: THE NEW RACE FOR TOMORROW’S 
NATURAL RESOURCES 13–25 (2009); see also RICHARD SALE, THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC: 
OWNERSHIP, EXPLOITATION AND CONFLICT IN THE FAR NORTH (2009); Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic 
Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 63 (2008). 
12. See Donald L. Gautier et al., Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic, 324  
SCI. 1175 (2009). 
13. Arild Moe, Potential Arctic Oil and Gas Development: What Are Reasonable Expectations?, in THE 
ARCTIC IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A NORTH PACIFIC DIALOGUE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARCTIC (2012 
NORTH PACIFIC ARCTIC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS) 227, 227–47 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., 2012). 
14. Bjørn Gunnarsson, The Future of Arctic Marine Operations and Shipping Logistics, in THE ARCTIC 
IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A NORTH PACIFIC DIALOGUE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARCTIC (2013 NORTH 
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passage over the Arctic attractive during the foreseeable future. Most Arctic 
shipping will involve destinational traffic carrying bulk cargoes, such as natural gas 
produced on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic and shipped from the new 
port of Sabetta.15 This is not to say that the role of the Arctic in the global economic 
picture will be unimportant. But what does seem certain is that grandiose claims 
regarding a new Arctic “gold rush” are unjustified, and the economic future of the 
Arctic will be sensitive to fluctuations in global forces (e.g., the world oil market, 
the stability of the Middle East) that are hard to forecast with any certainty and that 
will make investment decisions involving developments spanning several decades 
risky. 
All these economic calculations are complicated by the impacts of geopolitical 
changes. It is popular in some quarters to focus on renewed Russian military 
activities in the Arctic, including the reoccupation of military bases abandoned in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the augmentation of the Northern 
Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula, and the resumption of bomber flights in close 
proximity to the airspace of other Arctic states. Some western observers 
immediately jump to the conclusion that we are witnessing a resumption of the Cold 
War and that the future of the Arctic will be marked by an increase in militarization 
with all of the attendant dangers of action/reaction processes and unintended 
clashes.16 The recent conflict over the future of the Ukraine has intensified such 
expectations in some quarters. We now find ourselves engaging in serious 
discussions about the prospects of insulating the Arctic from global geopolitical 
developments in order to preserve the region as a zone of peace and prosperity. 
Some concrete spillovers are already occurring, such as the suspension of the 
collaborative effort between Rosneft and ExxonMobil to drill for oil in the Kara 
Sea, a result of western sanctions imposed on Russia in connection with the conflict 
in the Ukraine.17 
In many respects, these arguments are exaggerated, reflecting an engrained 
mindset rather than realities on the ground or on the water.18 The Arctic is no longer 
an important theater of operations for strategic weapons systems of critical 
importance to the military balance between the superpowers. There are no conflicts 
in the Arctic itself that are serious enough to lead to armed clashes between or 
among the Arctic states. Russian military activities in the Arctic are not remotely on 
a scale that should be treated as worrisome by observers in other Arctic states. The 
Arctic states have pledged to resolve issues arising in the Arctic under existing legal 
 
PACIFIC ARCTIC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS) 37, 37–38 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., 2013). 
15. Id. at 74. 
16. Oran R. Young, The Future of the Arctic: Cauldron of Conflict or Zone of Peace? 87 INT’L  
AFF. 185, 186 (2011). 
17. See LASSI HEININEN ET AL., RUSSIAN STRATEGIES IN THE ARCTIC: AVOIDING A NEW 
COLD WAR 24–25 (2014), http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/arctic_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ8T-
RHQJ]; Clifford Krauss, Exxon Halts Oil Drilling in Waters of Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2014, at B6. 
18. See HEININEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 31. 
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regimes like the arrangements set forth in the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Efforts to address specific issues, such as claims to extended jurisdiction over 
the seabed in the Arctic, are unfolding in conformity with this pledge.19 There is no 
evidence to suggest that the Arctic is becoming a zone of conflict rather than a zone 
of peace. 
Yet it is important not to dismiss the significance of geopolitical developments 
on a global scale for the future of the Arctic.20 Russia’s recent initiatives, including 
the annexation of Crimea and interventions in civil conflicts in Syria and the 
Ukraine, reflect a deep-seated desire to be acknowledged as a great power on the 
global stage, a desire that is hard to ignore given the fact that Russia remains a 
nuclear power and that it has emerged as a major player in world energy markets.21 
The rise of China, which is expected to overtake the United States as the world’s 
largest economy in the near future, is another geopolitical development that cannot 
be ignored. More generally, what we are seeing is a broad shift in the global 
geopolitical landscape characterized by the (relative) decline in the dominant 
position of the United States and the rise of a number of new (or renewed) great 
powers, including India, Brazil, China, and Russia. In political terms, this means that 
the world is shifting from a unipolar system to a new multipolar system.22 Whether 
or not this development will introduce new instabilities on a global scale is a matter 
of intense interest and debate among both practitioners and analysts.23 But it is 
certain to have important consequences for the Arctic as a distinct region, and more 
specifically, for the activities of the Arctic Council. The Arctic states continue to 
dominate the work of the Council. Tensions between Russia and the West, even if 
they are driven by non-Arctic concerns, will complicate efforts to reach a consensus 
within the Council on a range of substantive issues. It will become progressively 
harder to ignore the Arctic interests of China and even those of India, Japan, and 
Korea, which are currently relegated to the rather marginal status of observer states 
in the Council. 
A common theme that runs through all these biophysical, economic, and 
geopolitical forces of change is the tightening of the links between the Arctic as a 
distinct region and the global system. One important inference to be drawn from 
this observation is that global forces beyond the control of regional bodies like the 
Arctic Council will play a prominent role in determining the future of the Arctic. 
Although the impacts of climate change are being felt more dramatically in the 
 
19. YOUNG, supra note 16, at 189. 
20. I.N. Timofeev, World Order or World Anarchy? A Look at the Modern System of International 
Relations 26, 33–34 (Russian International Affairs Council, Working Paper No. 18, 2014), 
http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC_WP_18_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVA2-
ZYXG]. 
21. For a generally balanced account on Russia’s recent political initiative, see MARLENE 
LARUELLE, RUSSIA’S ARCTIC STRATEGIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE FAR NORTH (2014). 
22. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., IS THE AMERICAN CENTURY OVER? 95–96 (2015). 
23. See Timofeev, supra note 20, at 5. 
 106 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:99 
 
Arctic than anywhere else, climate change is a global phenomenon driven by forces 
far beyond the southern boundaries of the region. China, for example, now 
accounts for about twenty-eight percent of the global emissions of carbon dioxide.24 
Similarly, market prices for oil and gas and macro-level trends in patterns of ocean 
shipping are determined by factors operating outside the Arctic region. An array of 
factors including conflict in the Middle East, the behavior of OPEC, and advances 
in extraction techniques, gives rise to a high degree of volatility in the world market 
price of oil. The same is true of the geopolitical drivers. It would be a mistake to 
interpret enhanced Russian military activities in the Arctic as a response to emerging 
conflicts in the region. The shift toward a more multipolar global political system 
has far more to do with developments outside the Arctic than with any regional 
developments. 
The relationship between the region and the global system is therefore 
substantially asymmetrical. Global forces will shape the future of the region to a 
large degree. Yet the flow of influence is not entirely unidirectional. Arctic feedback 
processes affect the global climate system; the consequences would be particularly 
dramatic if the Greenland ice sheet should begin to disintegrate. While Arctic oil 
and gas is expensive, it is largely free of the political uncertainties associated with 
production in many other regions. As a result, Arctic energy resources may play a 
welcome stabilizing role in world markets that are known for their disruptive 
volatility. Even in geopolitical terms, the Arctic may have some influence on global 
developments. The Arctic region today is a zone of peace and prosperity, in which 
major issues are resolved in a manner that is largely cooperative. Assuming the 
Arctic states are able to insulate the region against spillovers from outside conflicts, 
the Arctic may emerge as a model that those engaged in other regions will find of 
interest as they consider the prospects for achieving conditions of peace and 
prosperity in their areas of interest. 
One observation that does emerge from this account is that non-Arctic actors, 
including the European Union as well as states like China and India, must think not 
only in terms of their Arctic interests, but also in terms of their responsibility for 
the future of the Arctic. Countries like China and the United Kingdom, for instance, 
like to characterize themselves as near-Arctic states, to describe the Arctic as part 
of the common heritage of humankind, and to suggest that these considerations 
give them a legitimate interest in decision making about Arctic matters.25 Without 
attempting to evaluate these types of arguments, however, it is important to balance 
the articulation of interests with an acknowledgement of responsibility for the 
 
24. Global Carbon Budget Highlights, GLOB. CARBON PROJECT, 
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/14/hl-full.htm [https://web.archive.org/
web/20151205023503/http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/14/hl-full.htm]. 
25. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ARCTIC, REPORT, RESPONDING TO A CHANGING 
ARCTIC, 2014-15, HL 115 at 34, 91–93 (UK), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld201415/ldselect/ldarctic/118/118.pdf [https://perma.cc/76SG-GHF4]; Elizabeth C. Economy, 
China’s Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 80, 88 (2014). 
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biophysical and socioeconomic integrity of the Arctic. There is much to be said for 
the proposition that a genuine expression of concern about matters of this sort 
would make a significant difference in the receptivity of Arctic actors to initiatives 
on the part of outsiders designed to increase their presence in the Arctic. 
II. THE FUTURE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
What are the implications of this characterization of the rapid change in the 
Arctic for the effectiveness of the Arctic Council? Does this account yield insights 
that should be of interest to those in a position to make adjustments to the status 
of the Council, its operating procedures, and its substantive priorities? It is apparent 
at the outset that a preference for the status quo is not a viable option.26 The Arctic 
is changing in ways that will impact the activities of the Council whether those in a 
position to manage the activities of the Council like it or not. However, this is a 
sweeping observation with policy implications that are by no means clear. 
In this section, I explore the implications of the developments canvassed in 
the preceding section for the activities of the Council in more concrete terms. 
Specifically, I examine: (i) the legal and political status of the Arctic Council; (ii) the 
Council’s remit; (iii) relations between the Arctic Council and other 
intergovernmental bodies; and (iv) the administrative and financial resources 
available to the Council. I cast the analysis in the form of questions and answers 
dealing with each of these topics. 
Would it be helpful to make the Arctic Council into a “normal” 
intergovernmental organization? Many practitioners and analysts regard the legal 
and political status of the Council as a defect to be remedied at the first 
opportunity.27 The Council is based on a ministerial declaration that is not legally 
binding. Unlike many other intergovernmental bodies (e.g., the Antarctic Treaty 
System, the IMO, the World Trade Organization, the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization), the Council lacks the legal authority to make decisions that are 
binding on its members. Even the recent agreements on search and rescue (2011)28 
and oil spill preparedness and response (2013),29 both of which were negotiated 
 
26. For a collection of papers originally presented during the conference, see THE ARCTIC 
COUNCIL: ITS PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE (Thomas S. Axworthy et al. eds., 
2012). 
27. There is a somewhat analogous debate about the status of the UN Environment 
Programme, which is a body created under the auspices of a UN General Assembly resolution. Some 
analysts believe that turning UNEP into a UN Environment Organization (UNEO) would enhance its 
effectiveness substantially. See FRANK BIERMANN, EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE: WORLD POLITICS 
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 65–77 (Frank Biermann & Oran R. Young eds., 2014). 
28. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 
May 12, 2011, 13 T.I.A.S. No. 13-119 [hereinafter Search and Rescue Agreement]. 
29. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic, May 15, 2013, http://arcticjournal.com/sites/default/files/mm08_agreement_on_oil_ 
pollution_preparedness_and_response_signed_appendices_original_130510.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K8FG-545Q] [hereinafter Marine Oil Agreement]. 
 108 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:99 
 
under the auspices of the Council, are not formal arrangements adopted by the 
Arctic Council.30 The informal status of the Council is also reflected in the fact that 
it is not an intergovernmental organization with the capacity to launch 
programmatic activities or the authority to adopt an indicative budget that members 
are expected to fund. This has not prevented the Council from creating a (small) 
permanent secretariat located in Tromsø, Norway that opened for business in 2013. 
However, it does limit the capacity of the Council in significant ways and ensures 
that the Council is dependent on voluntary contributions from members to conduct 
substantive work on specific topics. 
Is this a serious problem? Might there be drawbacks as well as benefits 
associated with making the Arctic Council into a normal intergovernmental 
organization? Answers to these questions are rooted in my assessment of the nature 
of the Council’s role and the sorts of resources required to play this role effectively. 
If, as I have argued, the success of the Council lies in its ability to identify emerging 
issues, frame them for consideration in policymaking processes, and push them 
toward the top of the policy agenda, then the current legal and political status of the 
Council may not be a serious drawback. The authority to make binding decisions is 
not necessary to play this “generative” role effectively. In fact, a growing 
preoccupation with policy making as opposed to policy shaping may actually detract 
from a focus on what the Council does best. 
Certainly, some material resources are needed to perform the generative 
function well. I will come back to the issue of funding later. But it is important to 
note at this stage that the resources needed to play a generative role effectively are 
modest compared with the resources needed to address issues of administration, 
implementation, and compliance that are prominent concerns of many normal 
intergovernmental organizations. 
What about the drawbacks associated with becoming a normal 
intergovernmental organization? It is probable that such a transition would interfere 
with some of the most innovative features of the Arctic Council, such as the practice 
of including the permanent participants in virtually all the Council’s deliberations.31 
It might also complicate the efforts of the Arctic states to run the Council as a sort 
of club, excluding non-Arctic states from the status of members. Perhaps the most 
serious drawback of such a transition, however, would have to do with the ability 
of the Council to adapt nimbly to changing circumstances. It is notoriously difficult 
to adjust the provisions of treaty-based intergovernmental organizations to ensure 
that the fit, or match, between the organizations and the broader settings in which 
 
30. They are, instead, multilateral agreements signed by foreign ministers who had come 
together to participate in ministerial meetings of the Arctic Council. 
31. The permanent participants are organizations representing groups of indigenous peoples 
located in two or more Arctic Council member states (e.g., the Inuit Circumpolar Council) or multiple 
groups of indigenous peoples located in a single member state (e.g., the Russian Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of the North). Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants [https://perma.cc/CJ3U-MR5D]. 
 2016] ARCTIC COUNCIL AT TWENTY 109 
 
they operate continues to be good. In many cases—the Antarctic Treaty System is 
a good example32—progress depends on the laborious and often protracted process 
of negotiating new legally binding instruments. The Arctic Council, by contrast, has 
exhibited a high degree of nimbleness in adjusting its practices to changing 
circumstances on a more informal basis. Given the dynamic character of the Arctic 
region described in the preceding section, there are good reasons to prize this 
attribute of the Arctic Council. 
Would it be advantageous to broaden the remit of the Arctic Council? The 
mandate of the Arctic Council is well defined and strictly limited. The Council 
inherited from its predecessor, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS),33 a mandate to deal with matters of environmental protection. To this 
mandate, the Ottawa Declaration34 added a concern for sustainable development, 
construed as a “separate but equal” theme alongside environmental protection.35 In 
practice this has proven to be somewhat confusing. In the mainstream 
conceptualization of sustainable development, environmental protection is treated 
as one of the three pillars, along with economic development and the protection of 
social and cultural values. In a sense, therefore, the specification of the Council’s 
remit in the Ottawa Declaration is based on a category error. The Environmental 
Protection Programme should operate within the overarching framework of the 
Sustainable Development Programme, rather than as a separate, co-equal, and 
somewhat autonomous track in the activities of the Council. 
This may account for the somewhat awkward nature of the Council’s activities. 
Five of the Council’s six working groups deal more or less explicitly with matters of 
environmental protection.36 Four of them were inherited from the AEPS and 
developed personalities of their own prior to becoming Arctic Council working 
groups. The Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), set up to fulfill 
the terms of the Ottawa Declaration,37 has struggled to define a clear-cut role for 
itself within this system. The activities of the SDWG lack a core focus, are sensitive 
to the activities of the other working groups with regard to turf, and are closely 
controlled by the country holding the chairmanship of the Council.38 The Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), for example, has produced 
 
32. Oran R. Young, Governing the Antipodes: International Cooperation in Antarctica and the Arctic, 
52 POLAR RECORD 230 (2016). 
33. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624. 
34. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1. 
35. Specifically, the Ottawa Declaration calls on the Arctic Council to “oversee and coordinate 
the programs established under the AEPS,” Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, at 1(b), and to “adopt 
terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program.” Id. at 1(c). 
36. See Lawson W. Brigham, International Cooperation in Arctic Marine Transportation, Safety and 
Environmental Protection, in THE ARCTIC IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A NORTH PACIFIC DIALOGUE ON 
THE FUTURE OF THE ARCTIC 115, 121 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., Korea Maritime Institute 2013) 
(defining the Arctic Council’s six working groups). 
37. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1. 
38. Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), Operating Guidelines, para. 2, (May 
14, 2002). 
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guidelines for oil and gas development,39 and the Working Group on the Protection 
of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) has conducted the Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment (AMSA).40 But both of these topics have at least as much to 
do with sustainable development as they have to do with environmental protection. 
In short, there are significant issues regarding the allocation of policy concerns 
among the various working groups of the Council. 
Beyond this lie issues relating to efforts to expand the remit of the Arctic 
Council to address a broader range of issues. Some of this takes the form of 
establishing task forces to address issues that are regarded as having more or less 
direct policy relevance, such as oil spill prevention, short-lived climate pollutants, 
engagement with the business community, and cooperation with the science 
community. Although not envisioned in the language of the Ottawa Declaration, 
there is nothing to stop the Council from creating task forces so long as it is clearly 
understood that their conclusions have no legal status. Individual task forces have 
produced constructive results. But they can also lead to confusion and frustration 
regarding the proper role of the Arctic Council. The Circumpolar Business Forum 
Task Force played an important role in the launching of what is now called the 
Arctic Economic Council, for example, but it is anything but clear what the 
relationship between this new mechanism and the Arctic Council itself is or should 
be.41 Given the fact that a high proportion of the short-lived climate pollutants 
originate outside the Arctic and even outside the Arctic states, the capacity of the 
Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane to address this concern was severely 
limited. For the most part, its efforts were exhortatory, and there is little evidence 
to suggest that those with the authority to address these concerns pay much 
attention to the efforts of the Arctic Council.42 
More broadly, there are increasing calls for the Arctic Council to take on issues 
of security, whether these are framed as matters of military security, environmental 
security, or even human security. The Ottawa Declaration has a (in)famous 
footnote, inserted at the insistence of the United States, stating explicitly that the 
Council should not deal with matters of military security.43 There is a lively debate 
regarding the extent to which casting issues of environmental protection and human 
 
39. Henry P. Huntington, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Oil and  
Gas 2007, (Nov. 2007), http://www.amap.no/documents/download/1017 [https://perma.cc/
2WZT-9HCD]. 
40. Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, supra note 3. 
41. See, e.g., Michael Stickman, International Chair of the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Remarks 
at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Iqaluit 2015. 
42. The proper division of labor between the Circumpolar Business Forum Task Force and 
AMAP is also a source of some confusion. See, e.g., Anastasia Telesetsky, Overcoming Climate Inertia with 
Unilateral Action on Black Carbon, in THE SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE OF SPACE LAW 245 
(Paul Martin et al. eds., 2015); see also Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Progress 
Report 2013–2015, at 1. 
43. Specifically, the Ottawa Declaration states that “[t]he Arctic Council should not deal with 
matters related to military security.” Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, at n.1. 
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well-being as matters of security is a progressive step or a step in the wrong 
direction.44 Given what I have said in the preceding section about the forces of 
change in the Arctic, it is perhaps understandable that some practitioners and 
analysts have a strong desire to broaden the remit of the Council to allow it to 
address newly emerging issues and, in the process, to remain relevant to the Arctic 
agenda. Understandable as this desire is, this could very well prove to be an 
unproductive strategy.45 The Arctic Council is not well equipped to become a venue 
for addressing broader questions of global climate change, and an effort to take on 
issues of military security could easily undermine or tarnish the efforts of the 
Council to address other concerns. Perhaps the way forward is to sort out the 
internal confusion regarding the relationship between environmental protection and 
sustainable development and to craft a coherent narrative to support efforts to 
maintain the Arctic as a zone of prosperity. 
How should the Arctic Council interact with other intergovernmental bodies 
whose remit encompasses Arctic issues? Many other intergovernmental bodies have 
mandates that cover issues that are relevant to the Arctic. At this stage, we are 
particularly aware of the relevance of the IMO, which is the body with the authority 
to adopt and promulgate the legally binding rules that will make up the Polar Code 
applicable to commercial shipping in the Arctic. But there are many other 
international organizations that can and do play similar roles. These include the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Trade Organization to name a few. To 
make the picture more complex, it is worth noting as well that a wide range of 
nongovernmental organizations, such as the Association of Arctic Expedition 
Cruise Operators, the International Association of Classification Societies, and the 
International Organization for Standardization, have also gotten into the act when 
it comes to dealing with matters that have implications for governance in the 
Arctic.46 
 
44. See, e.g., Gregory D. Foster, A New Security Paradigm, WORLD WATCH, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 
39, http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/EP181B.pdf [https://perma.cc/725X-25FT]; 
Diane French, A Case for Climate Security in the Arctic Council Agenda, STIMSON (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.stimson.org/content/case-climate-security-arctic-council-agenda [https://perma.cc
/HVA7-REC7].  See generally Sumudu Atapattu, Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human 
Beings) Survive this Onslaught?, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 35 (2008); Richard A. Matthew, The 
Environment as a National Security Issue, 12 J. POL’Y HIST. 101 (2000). 
45. See Proposed U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship Program 2015–2017, 22 (Feb. 2015). 
46. See DAVID VANDERZWAAG ET AL., DALHOUSIE UNIV. MARINE & ENVTL. LAW INST., 
GOVERNANCE OF ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING 2, 3, 17, 39 (2008), http://www.dal.ca/
content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/law/MELAW/MELAW_AMSA_Governance_of_Arctic_Marine_Ship
ping_Final_Report__AUG1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLE9-5CR5]; see also Ass’n of Arctic Expedition 
Cruise Operators, AECO’s Guidelines for Expedition Cruise Operations in the Arctic (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.aeco.no/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2014-10-15-AECO-Operational-Guidelines1.doc; 
Int’l Ass’n of Classification Soc’ys, Requirements Concerning Polar Class (2011),  
http://www.aeco.no/guidelines/operational-guidelines/ [https://web.archive.org/web/016031
2064037/http://www.aeco.no/guidelines/operational-guidelines/]; Int’l Org. for Standardization 
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Under no circumstances will the Arctic Council absorb the functions of any 
of these other bodies. So, the question becomes how could or should the Council 
interact with these organizations both individually and collectively? One response 
to this question focuses on the role of the Council as a catalyst that can prompt 
action on the part of other bodies and provide useful input into the deliberations of 
these bodies. A particularly clear case-in-point involves the role of AMSA, a Council 
effort carried out by PAME, with regard to the development of a legally binding 
Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO.47 The Council itself lacks the authority 
to make formal decisions about such matters. But there is no doubt that AMSA 
stimulated international interest regarding this issue and provided background 
information helpful to those negotiating the provisions of the Polar Code. 
Conversely, there may be a role for the Arctic Council in overseeing the 
implementation of the provisions of the Polar Code. The Council lacks both the 
authority and the resources to assume responsibility for the implementation of the 
Polar Code. But it may be able to help in monitoring the implementation of the 
code, drawing attention to what is working well or not so well and engaging in 
informed discussions of next steps in cases where there appear to be problems with 
the performance of this regulatory regime. Commercial shipping is just one example 
of the interaction between the Arctic Council and other intergovernmental bodies 
with mandates to address matters of interest to the Arctic. Other opportunities of 
this sort are easy to identify, and it is worthwhile to keep a sharp watch on the 
emergence of such opportunities in a variety of issue areas. 
Another response to the question about relations between the Arctic Council 
and other intergovernmental bodies involves the adaptation of broader international 
regimes to the particular circumstances prevailing in the Arctic. The 2011 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic, for instance, is designed to be nested into the broader framework of the 
current version of IMO’s Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).48 A 
similar relationship exists between the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine 
Oil Spill Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic and IMO’s 1990 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
 
(ISO),Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries—Arctic Offshore Structures (2010), http://www.iso.org/
iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=33690. 
47. ARCTIC LAW & POLICY INST., UNIV. OF WASH., ARCTIC LAW & POLICY YEAR IN REVIEW: 
2014 (2015), https://www.law.washington.edu/arcticlaw/reports/ArcticLawYearReview 2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2YF-4E38]. 
48. The Search and Rescue agreement, although not primarily designed to prevent shipping 
accidents, “calls for coordination and communication among the [Arctic States], including the exchange 
of weather and ocean forecasts and warnings, joint exercises and training, shared support services, and 
use of ship reporting systems for search and rescue purposes.” Andrew Hartsig et al., Arctic Bottleneck: 
Protecting the Bering Strait Region from Increased Vessel Traffic, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35, 66 (2012). See 
Search and Rescue Agreement, supra note 28; see also International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 18961. 
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operation (OPRC).49 In a sense, this makes the work of the Arctic Council 
subordinate to the authority of other intergovernmental bodies like the IMO. But 
this does not marginalize or trivialize the activities of the Council. In many areas, 
conditions prevailing in the Arctic differ substantially from those prevailing in other 
parts of the world. Devising regulatory measures that are well matched to Arctic 
conditions is essential when it comes to maximizing their effectiveness in addressing 
Arctic problems. And nesting these measures into broader arrangements like 
SOLAS and OPRC may play an important role in maximizing their legitimacy. 
An encompassing role pertaining to relations between the Arctic Council and 
other intergovernmental bodies has to do with integrating or meshing the activities 
of a variety of functionally specific arrangements. Thus, there are bodies competent 
to address matters like safety at sea, marine pollution, fishing, ship-based tourism, 
scientific research, and so forth.50 But none of these bodies has a remit to ask how 
all these functional arrangements affect one another or fit together in such a way as 
to form a coherent regime governing human activities in the Arctic. This is the issue 
now discussed in the broader literature on international regime complexes in terms 
of factors affecting fragmentation and integration.51 The Ottawa Declaration 
certainly does not anticipate a role of this sort for the Arctic Council, and the 
Council lacks the authority to make formal decisions of the sort needed to assemble 
the pieces of this jigsaw puzzle into a coherent whole. Nevertheless, the Council, 
operating largely through the activities of its working groups, is in a better position 
than any other intergovernmental body to identify gaps and overlaps in the 
initiatives of other bodies applying to the Arctic, to track the development of these 
concerns over time, and to assess the pros and cons of various measures to address 
these concerns.52 This is an ambitious role that could overstretch the capacity of the 
Council in its current form. But it is worth noting that this important role would 
not require any formal changes in the terms of the Ottawa Declaration and would 
fit comfortably with the generative role that is central to the effectiveness of the 
Council. 
Are there opportunities to enhance the administrative capacity and to increase 
 
49. The agreement includes a number of commitments for the member states of the Arctic 
Council in order to address oil pollution that may affect the Arctic marine environment, including 
requirements for preparedness and response systems, notification and information exchange, and 
coordinated responses. See Sara Vinson et al., International Environmental Law, 48 INT’L LAW. 435, 439–
40 (2014); Marine Oil Agreement, supra note 29; see also International Convention on Oil Pollution  
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 32194. 
50. For example, the International Maritime Organization oversees the safety of navigation and 
prevention of marine pollution. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization manages fisheries in 
the northwestern part of the Atlantic Ocean. The International Arctic Science Committee is dedicated 
to scientific research in the Arctic. 
51. For a discussion of this literature, see Amandine Orsini et al., Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a 
Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?, 19 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 27, 27–39 (2013). 
52. For a general account of “interplay management,” see MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEXITY: REGIME INTERPLAY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, at vii-ix (Sebastian 
Oberthür & Olav Schram Stokke eds., 2011). 
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the financial resources available to the Arctic Council? The Arctic Council is a 
simple intergovernmental body. Under the terms of the Ottawa Declaration, the 
chairmanship rotates among the member states at two-year intervals, and the chair 
takes responsibility for organizing meetings and providing resources needed to 
underwrite meetings of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) and the biennial 
ministerial meetings.53 Over time, this initial arrangement has evolved in a number 
of directions. The individual working groups have secretariats of their own, mostly 
supported by the relevant host countries. Individual countries have contributed 
resources on a voluntary basis needed to carry out specific projects. An Indigenous 
Peoples’ Secretariat has been able to provide some support for participation in 
Council activities on the part of representatives of the permanent participants.54 
More recently, the member states agreed to establish a permanent (but modest) 
Arctic Council Secretariat based at the Fram Centre in Tromsø with a budget 
sufficient to maintain a small professional staff. Nevertheless, the Council remains 
a lightly administered body lacking the material resources needed to become an 
influential player in its own right. 
Is this a problem? So long as the Council prioritizes its generative role, it does 
not need to grow into a more substantial organization with a sufficiently large staff 
to become active in the realm of implementation and a dependable budget to 
support a role of this sort. To the extent that my answers to the previous questions 
are convincing, the current situation may not be in need of drastic restructuring. 
One exception to this observation may relate to the integrative role described in the 
answer to the preceding question regarding relations with other intergovernmental 
bodies. If the Arctic Council becomes active in an effort to integrate sectoral 
approaches to Arctic governance, even as a generative task, additional and dedicated 
resources will be required. This is not a role that can be assigned to one or another 
of the working groups, though the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
has sometimes made helpful contributions in this realm in the absence of anyone 
else able to play the role. In the nature of things, such an integrative role would 
require personnel able to think systematically about linkages among distinct areas 
and equipped with a specific mandate to engage in an effort of this sort. A budget 
for this purpose would be essential, though it would not require additional resources 
on a large scale. 
Where the existing situation does leave a good deal to be desired is in the 
provision of a regular budget to support normal Arctic Council activities. It is worth 
differentiating at least three issues in this realm. First, the Arctic Council Secretariat 
lacks the resources to conduct anything beyond a bare-bones operation. Second, as 
 
53. Arctic Council, Revised Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, ¶ 10, (May 15, 2013), 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure 
_website_version.pdf. 
54. Erik Gant, History of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL ( July 10, 2012), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/313-history-of-the-
arctic-council-permanent-participants [https://perma.cc/RL35-BF9J]. 
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the activities of the Council expand, the permanent participants are finding it 
increasingly difficult to mobilize the human and material resources needed to play 
an active role in the full range of Council activities. Since the development of the 
role of permanent participants is one of the most innovative features of the Council, 
this is a matter of considerable concern. Third, the working groups are at the mercy 
of individual countries (and occasionally non-governmental bodies) willing to 
contribute to the initiation and conduct of projects on a voluntary basis. This makes 
it impossible for the working groups to exercise control over their own programs, 
set priorities and invest resources in projects that they deem to be most important 
to fulfill the Council’s mandate, and track the results of their recommendations on 
a sustained basis. The result has been a hodgepodge of ad-hoc initiatives, moving 
forward sometimes on a stop-and-go basis, that do not add up to a coherent 
program and that often peter out without clear results. The problem is more severe 
in some cases, such as the Sustainable Development Working Group—which is 
controlled by the current chair but nevertheless lacks resources of its own—than in 
others, such as AMAP—which has benefitted from long-term core support on the 
part of Norway. It is probably fair to say that the resultant lack of programmatic 
coherence constitutes the most serious organizational problem that the Arctic 
Council faces today.55 
What can we say about the feasibility of addressing the issues identified in this 
section? In some respects, the needs of the Arctic Council are surprisingly modest. 
As I have argued, it is probably unnecessary to turn the Council into a normal 
intergovernmental organization. The principal challenge regarding the Council’s 
remit has to do with internal issues, like the relationship between environmental 
protection and sustainable development, rather than broadening the Council’s 
mandate to tackle a wider range of concerns. The Council will not take over the 
roles of other relevant intergovernmental bodies, like the IMO, ICAO, or FAO. 
What is needed in organizational terms is an enhanced capacity to play an integrative 
role focused on the need to address gaps and overlaps in the activities of other 
bodies whose work has implications for the Arctic. The need for additional 
administrative capacity and material resources is not large, at least by comparison 
with the resources needed to operate most mainstream intergovernmental 
organizations. Certainly, the bottom line would come to tens of millions rather than 
hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. 
This is not to say that the status quo is fine, or that a little technical fine-tuning 
will suffice to address the issues facing the Council today. Clearly, political will is 
required to enhance the ability of the Council to operate as effectively as possible 
under current conditions. In bygone days, when the Arctic was largely “out of sight 
and out of mind” for those interested in international governance, mobilizing the 
willpower needed to address such issues would have seemed an insurmountable 
 
55. See Puala Kankaanpää & Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council, 31 POLAR 
RESEARCH, 17176 (2012). 
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barrier. But now, especially in the wake of the events of the last decade, the situation 
is different. The Arctic has become a focus of unprecedented interest, not only for 
the Arctic states, but also for states like China, Japan, and Korea and international 
bodies like the European Union.56 The number of high-level conferences and 
workshops dealing with Arctic issues is astonishing to those of us who worked on 
Arctic issues when they were of interest only to a narrow band of Arctic specialists. 
In such an environment, the level of effort required to come to terms with the issues 
I have articulated in this section should not loom as an insurmountable hurdle. 
III. WHAT LIES AHEAD? 
There is every reason to expect the dynamism that has characterized the Arctic 
in recent years to continue to be a prominent feature of the region during the 
foreseeable future. Some of the resultant developments will have important 
implications for the work of the Arctic Council. The forces at work are complex; 
there is no way to predict exactly what form major changes in the Arctic will take. 
Still, it is possible to identify and comment on a range of plausible developments 
that illustrate types of change likely to have significant implications for the 
operation of the Arctic Council. Consider, in this light, the following possibilities: 
(i) the need to relocate whole communities in the Arctic due to the impacts of 
climate change, (ii) changes in sea ice allowing for transpolar shipping that avoids 
both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, (iii) the growth of mining 
(including rare earth elements) as an economic activity rivaling oil and gas 
development in the Arctic, (iv) the emergence of an independent Greenland altering 
the composition of the group of Arctic states, (v) the intensification of bilateral 
relationships (e.g., China/Russia, China/Greenland) as a major feature of Arctic 
politics, and (vi) the development of more proactive policies on the part of non-
Arctic states regarding the high seas in the Central Arctic Ocean (i.e., the roughly 
2.8 million square kilometers of high seas that lie beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction). How would these sorts of developments affect the operation of the 
Arctic Council, and what steps could be taken to maintain the effectiveness of the 
Council under the circumstances? 
The principal effects of some of these changes will take the form of impacts 
on the range of issues competing for the Council’s attention. American 
policymakers have identified “Arctic climate adaptation and resilience” and 
“improving economic and living conditions” in the Arctic as priorities for the U.S. 
Chairmanship during 2015–2017.57 Most mining activities in the Arctic are likely to 
take place on land controlled by individual states. But large-scale mining has 
 
56. See Juha Käpylä & Harri Mikkola, Finnish Inst. of Int’l. Aff. (FIIA), The Global Arctic: The 
Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union, 3, 8, Briefing Paper 133, 
(Aug. 2013), http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp133.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTL6-XBF4]. 
57. See John Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Presentation of the U.S. 
Chairmanship Program at the Arctic Council Ministerial (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/remarks/2015/04/241102.htm [https://perma.cc/QE2N-X8Y6]. 
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important implications for sustainable development in the Arctic, and the 
operations of bulk carriers carrying ore may loom large in the development of 
commercial shipping in the region. The challenge for the Arctic Council in this 
connection will be to devise a method to set priorities in the interest of 
concentrating its efforts on issues of particular importance from a circumpolar 
perspective rather than following the scattershot approach that has characterized its 
activities in the past. A particularly important challenge will be to strengthen the 
capacity of the Council to address issues that belong first and foremost to the 
domain of sustainable development. In the past, the Council has done a better job 
of dealing with matters of environmental protection than matters of sustainable 
development. While environmental protection will continue to occupy an important 
place in the work of the Council, both the biophysical and the economic forces at 
work in the Arctic will highlight issues of sustainable development and put pressure 
on those responsible for the activities of the Council to exhibit leadership in an 
effort to find ways to foster sustainability in a dynamic region. 
Other developments will pose challenges regarding the composition and 
character of the Council itself. A dramatic case in point would be the emergence of 
Greenland as a fully independent state with an overwhelmingly indigenous 
population.58 There would be no reason to deny full membership on the Council to 
an independent Greenland. But how would this affect the status of Denmark, whose 
only remaining claim to membership on the Council would stem from its 
jurisdiction over the Faeroe Islands? It might make sense in this situation to drop 
Denmark as a member of the Arctic Council, though the Council has no explicit 
procedure either for the accession of new members or for the de-accession of 
existing members. And what would be the consequences of this stream of 
developments for the role of the permanent participants? Greenland has been a 
prominent force in the activities of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, one of the most 
active and effective of the permanent participants. It seems clear that significant 
adjustments would be called for in conjunction with this set of circumstances. It is 
difficult to anticipate what form these adjustments could or should take. But the 
basic point is clear: changes in the Arctic during the foreseeable future may raise 
important questions not only about how to prioritize issues on the Council’s agenda 
but also about how to adjust important features of the Council itself in the light of 
major changes. 
Beyond these considerations lie changes that would raise questions about the 
relevance of the Arctic Council as the proper body to address Arctic issues. 
Bilateralism that is largely economic in nature is a routine matter that has few 
implications for the work of the Council. There is nothing out of the ordinary, for 
example, about Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), a Korean 
 
58. The total population of Greenland is less than 60,000, but over eighty percent of those living 
in Greenland are indigenous. See Michael Byers, Arctic Region, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 36 (2010). 
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company, constructing LNG tankers for Novatek, a Russian company that is the 
lead developer of Yamal gas reserves. But there is a more political form of 
bilateralism that can become a competitor to the multilateral approach to regional 
cooperation embedded in the work of the Arctic Council. China, in particular, has 
often exhibited a preference for bilateral versus multilateral forms of cooperation.59 
Recent developments involving Chinese-Russian agreements regarding Arctic 
energy resources and Chinese-Greenlandic discussions regarding the exploitation of 
mineral resources in Greenland exemplify this preference.60 Similarly, the growth of 
Arctic activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction (e.g., transpolar shipping) 
would pose a difficult problem for the Arctic Council. Regardless of the ultimate 
disposition of coastal state claims to jurisdiction over the seabed in the Arctic, the 
water column and the surface of the Central Arctic Ocean along with the 
superjacent airspace will remain open to activities on the part of all signatories to 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. No agreement regarding this area would 
be possible without the inclusion of a larger group of states than the eight members 
of the Arctic Council. The recent European Union proposal regarding the 
establishment of a marine sanctuary in the area around the North Pole is illustrative 
in this connection.61 Developments along these lines would raise serious questions 
about the scope of the Council’s remit and generate pressure either to alter the 
composition of the Council or to acknowledge that some important Arctic issues 
must be dealt with in other venues. 
The changes discussed in this section should not be treated as predictions; they 
are meant only to illustrate types of changes likely to occur during the foreseeable 
future that will affect the operation of the Arctic Council. But they do suggest that 
those responsible for the operation of the Council will need to confront three 
classes of pressures on an ongoing basis: (i) those requiring the setting of priorities 
for the work of the Council, (ii) those raising questions about the organizational 
character of the Council, and (iii) those involving issues framed in such a way that 
they lie outside the remit of the Council. There is every reason to expect that all 
three types of issues will arise (often simultaneously) in the future and that an ability 
to address them properly will have major consequences for the effectiveness of the 
Council. 
 
59. Elizabeth C. Economy & Michael Levi, BY ALL MEANS NECESSARY: HOW CHINA’S 
RESOURCE QUEST IS CHANGING THE WORLD 74 (2014). 
60. See, e.g., Press Release, Novatek, Novatek and the Silk Road Fund Conclude 
Framework Agreement on Acquisition of Stake in Yamal LNG (Sept. 3, 2015),  
http://www.novatek.ru/common/tool/stat.php?doc=/common/upload/press/_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U7FV-PNUU]; Press Release, Marketwired, Greenland Minerals and 
Energy Limited: Kvanefjeld Feasibility Study (May 25, 2015), http://www.marketwired.com/
press-release/greenland-minerals-and-energy-limited-kvanefjeld-feasibility-study-asx-ggg-
2022780.htm [https://perma.cc/76SV-Z4N8]. 
p 61. Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic, EUR. PARL. DOC., 2013/ 
2595(RSP) ¶ 38 (2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Arctic Council is dedicated to the promotion of peace and prosperity in a 
rapidly changing region. Its particular focus is on issues that fit within the rubrics 
of environmental protection and sustainable development. Since its establishment 
in 1996, the Council has proven surprisingly effective, but not because it has 
acquired the capacity to make authoritative decisions about transboundary issues 
arising in the Arctic. The key to its success lies in its ability to play what I have called 
a generative role. Maintaining the effectiveness of the Council during the 
foreseeable future will be a challenging task. Success will depend on two critical 
factors: (i) an understanding of roles or functions where the Council has a 
comparative advantage and (ii) an ability to adapt to the changing circumstances of 
the region in a prompt and nimble fashion. There are reasons to be optimistic about 
the ability of those responsible for the work of the Council to understand and act 
on these requirements. But success will require resistance to certain embedded 
assumptions about the operation of intergovernmental bodies (e.g., the view that 
the work of the Council should be underpinned by a legally binding instrument). 
Managed properly, the Arctic Council can continue to exemplify an approach to 
international cooperation that is not only well-suited to conditions prevailing in the 
Arctic but also worthy of consideration when addressing issues arising in other parts 
of the global system. 
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